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Deposit transformation, or term structure intermediation, is 
the process through which financial intermediaries create long­
term loans from short-term deposits. Although deposit 
transformation is a traditional and important topic of discussion 
for European banking systems, it has not been emphasized in the 
American banking literature. 1 Recent developments in Ü.S. 
capital markets, however, have important implications for the 
deposit transformation activities of U.S. institutions, most 
importantly the thrift institutions. In this paper a framework 
and theoretical model is developed for analyzing transformation 
activities, which is then applied to the actual sitution of these 
depository institutions. The theoretical model extends the recent 
work of Jaffee [19853 to the case in which the institutions act 
as price-takers in loan and deposit markets. The application to 
U.S. thrift institutions concerns both the positive aspects of 
thrift institution management and the normative aspects of 
government regulation of the institutions.
Depository institutions have available essentially three 
alternative strategies regarding the maturity characteristics of 
their portfolio. One strategy, termed tier matching, requires an 
exact balance of assets and liabilities at each maturity <lr 
duration) tier. Tier matched portfolios have the advantage that 
there is no risk with regard to interest rate fluctuations, but
1. See OECD [1967, p. 1043 and Hewson [19753 for discussions of 



























































































they have the potential disadvantage that profit levels are 
reduced if the tier matching constraint narrows the opportunity
set. A second strategy, called term structure intermediation. 
allows the institution to take advantage of arbitrage and 
speculative opportunities in the term structure of interest 
rates, even if the resulting portfolio is then mismatched by 
maturity. With an ascending yield curve, this leads to the 
traditional deposit transformation structure with institutions 
borrowing short-term and lending long-term. The third strategy, 
hedging alternatives, involves the use of specific positions in 
capital market securities or futures markets to offset the 
interest rate exposure of term structure intermediation. The key 
question with hedging strategies is the cost that must be paid in 
terms of reduced expected profits in order to obtain the desired 
reduction in risk.
Commercial banks in the U.S. appear in the normal course to 
operate with tier matched portfolios. 2 Banks do mismatch their 
portfolio at times, to be sure, but this is judged to be 
speculative behavior and is carried out only for brief periods 
and in response to what are considered unusal market 
opportunities. Even in these cases, moreover, the magnitude of 
the mismatch is limited; the difference in duration between 
assets "and liabilities is measured in weeks or at most months.
2. See Flannery and James [1984] and their citations for 
empirical evidence confirming that commercial bank portfolios are 
typically well balanced. Veit and Reiff [1983] provides survey 
evidence of the use of futures markets by commerical banks to 




























































































Thrift institutions in the U.S., in contrast, have operated 
through most of the period since World War II with dramatically 
mismatched portfolios, and the difference in duration between 
assets and liabilities is measured in years if not decades. Most 
thrift institutions, to be clear, have responded to the evident 
and extreme volatility in U.S. interest rate levels so far during 
the 1980s by attempting to carry out new lending in a tier 
matched fashion and/or to hedge the interest rate exposure. But 
the resulting profit levels have generally been very low, and new 
lending strategies address the issue of the already existing 
portfolio imbalance only by diluting its share of the total 
portfolio.
This major difference between commercial banks and thrift 
institutions is important because it provides an additional basis 
on which to evaluate some of the commonly offered explanations 
for why the thrift institutions operated as they did. One comstQn 
explanation, for example, is that Federal insurance of deposits 
and a limited degree of risk aversion are the key conditions 
leading to the use of term structure intermediation by thrift 
institutions. Commercial banks, however, also have Federal 
deposit insurance, and it is unclear why bank management would be 
more risk averse than thrift institution management.3 So Federal 
deposit insurance and the absence of risk aversion are not 
sufficient explanations for such thrift institution behavior.
3. Most commercial banks in the U.S. are shareholder-owned, 
whereas until recently most thrift institutions were mutual 
organizations. It would appear that this would create, if 





























































































Another possible explanation for the thrift institution behavior 
is that thrift management systematically maintains expectations 
that interest rate levels will decline. Here too, however, the 
argument is weak both because such expectations would have been 
wrong more often than not and because it is unclear why bank and 
thrift managements would systematically maintain different 
interest rate expectations.
The results of this paper point in a different direction 
concerning the historical reasons why the thrifts behaved as they 
did and the current issues of how to deal with the existing 
thrift institutions and their problems. The analysis here 
emphasizes the critical role of profit margins and profit 
opportunities in understanding the distinctive aspects of thrift 
institution behavior. Profit opportunities depend on the deposit 
and loan markets in which institutions operate, and there are 
important differences between commercial banks and thrift 
institutions in this regard. It is also noteworthy that the 
capital market conditions faced by all depository institutions 
and the portfolio choices available to thrift institutions have 
changed dramatically in recent years. The role of profit margins, 
changing capital market conditions, and a new regulatory 
environment are developed in the analysis that follows.
The agenda for the paper is as follows. In the following 
Section 2 the theory and model of term structure intermediation 
is developed, which provides the framework for the analysis. In 
Section 3 the argument is made for understanding the different 
behavior of commercial banks and thrift institutions as a 




























































































respective markets. In Section 4 the analysis is applied to the 
question of how the thrift institutions should now operate and of 
the appropriate regulatory positions.
2. A THEORY OF TERM STRUCTURE INTERMEDIATION
Discussions of term structure intermediation, or deposit 
transformation, are surprisingly rare in the American banking and 
financial intermediation literature. This literature has been 
thoroughly reviewed in recent surveys by Baltensperger [19803 and 
Santomero C19843. Only the papers by Niehans and Hewson C19763 
and Deshmukh, Greenbaum, and Kanatas C19833 even deal with 
alternative maturities and multi-period planning horizons, and 
their focus is quite different from the present one. Overall, 
Santoiero's summary that interest risk managment is an area that 
still, "requires serious modeling and empirical investigation to 
bring the academic literature up to the institutional realities," 
is very apt. 4
The portfolio duration literature also proves to be of only 
limited value for the issues at hand. The duration literature is 
directed primarily at analyzing the portfolio maturity structure 
that minimizes exposure to unexpected interest rate fluctuations, 
and it generally does not analyze the gains in expected profits
4. Santomero C19843, p. 597. Recent studies of the the provision 
of loan commitments and the pricing of floating rate loans by 
intermediaries represent another literature that deals with 
maturity questions. The commitment papers use option theory to 
value the commitments (Thakor, Greenbaum, and Hong [19813), while 
the trade-off between interest rate risk and credit risk is the 




























































































that are generated with exposed positions (Grove [19743 is an 
exception). This focus of duration theory is understandable 
because that literature proceeds on the premise of efficient 
markets and exposure to interest rate risk is idiosyncratic in 
that setting. The premise of efficient markets is not 
appropriate, however, in studying the behavior of financial 
intermediaries because these institutions exist exactly because 
there are market imperfections. 5
The model developed here proceeds directly from the 
traditional banking firm literature, as in Klein C19713, but 
brings maturity choice and a multi-period planning horizon into 
the analysis explictly. In a recent paper, Jaffee [19853, this 
theory is developed with the assumption that the intermediary has 
monopoly power in both its loan and deposit markets. In this 
paper, in contrast, it is assumed that the intermediary acts as a 
competitive price-taker in these markets as well as in the 
government securities and related capital markets. While it 
has been an open question whether competition or market power is 
the better assumption for describing depository intermediary 
behavior, a variety of recent innovations in U.S. capital markets 
(discussed below) push strongly in the competitive direction, and 
competition appears the appropriate assumption for present 
purposes.
Consider an institution that issues deposits (D), makes 
loans (A), and takes positions as either assets or liabilities in
5. This distinction between the traditional banking literature 




























































































<government.) securities (S) . Each instrument is available in two 
maturities, short-term (subscript 1) and long-term (subscript 2). 
A balance sheet for such an institution is shown in Table 1, 
where for purposes of illustration the short-term security 
position is an asset and the long-term security position is a 
liability.
Table 1
Balance Sheet At Initial Date (t=0)
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Ai Short-term Loans Di Short-term Deposits
Si Short-term Securities S2 Long-term Securities
A2 Long-term Loans D2 Long-term Deposits
The institution's profits are the interest receipts earned 
on the assets, less the interest expenses paid on the liabili­
ties, and less its operating costs C. The periodic interest yield 
on each instrument is denoted as the corresponding lower case 
symbol; thus di is the periodic interest rate paid on short-term 
deposits. These yields are treated as riskfree or risk adjusted.6
Asset positions are treated as algebraically positive, while
>liabilities are negative; thus A > 0, D < 0, and S < 0.
A period analysis is used in which one period (year) is the 
maturity of the short-term instruments and two periods is the 6
6. The capital market securities and deposits can be reasonably 
taken as risk free. Many loan contracts, however, remain risky 
even after collateral is included, but this risk can be reduced 
to an actuarial basis and the loan interest rate adjusted for the 





























































































maturity of the long-term instruments. The institution makes its 
initial decisions at t=0 at the beginning of period 1, the short­
term instruments mature at t=l at the end of period 1, and new 
decisions can be made at that time for period 2, and so forth.
The planning horizon for decisions made at the beginning of 
period 1 is equal to the two-period maturity of the long-term 
instruments. The analysis is carried out with a two-period model 
because it allows the main points to be developed with a minimum 
of notation.
Profits (P) over the two period horizon can be written as:
(1) P = Z2 tiaiAi+ isiSi+ idiDj_] + c (Di + D2> + g(Ai+Si+Di> .
i=l
The summation of the first three terms accounts for the interest 
income and expense on the three instruments for both maturities; 
recall that liabilities are algebraically negative. 7 This 
specification uses simple interest, and thus does not compound 
the earnings from period 1, but the returns on the long-term 
instruments are multiplied by 2 to account for their double­
length holding period. The operating costs <C) are specified as 
proportional to total deposits at t=0; that is, C = c (Di +D2> •
The last term in equation (1) concerns the necessary 
rollover at t=l of the short-term instruments that mature at that 
time. The sum (Ai+Si+Di) is the net short-term position, g is the 
average (effective) yield on this position when it is rolled-over 
for period 2. The return g is unknown at the initial date t=0.
7. Other sources of income, net worth, and initial portfolio 




























































































The role of the rollover term in the profit function can be 
further understood by considering the balance sheet constraint of 
the institution. The balance sheet constraint at the initial 
decision date t=0 is:
<2> A i  + S i  + D i  A2 + S 2  + D2  = 0 .
This is the algebraic sum of all available instruments and 
corresponds to the balance sheet shown in Table 1. At the end of 
period 1, however, the short-term instruments mature and the 
balance sheet will appear:
Table 2
T-Account Balance Sheet after Period 1 <t=l)
ASSETS LIABILITIES
A2 Long-term Loans D2 Long-term Deposits
G (=Ai+Si+Di> Gap S2 Long-term Securities
%
The three long-term positions of course remain on the 
balance sheet until they mature at t=2. The gap variable G 
represents the necessary rollover at t=l of the net value of the 
maturing one period positions. The revenue or cost associated 
with maintaining this position during period 2 is accounted for 
by the last term in the profit equation (1).
The rollover component of the profit function introduces a 
stochastic element because its interest yield (g> is unknown at 
t=0. This is analyzed with a mean/variance framework in which the 
institution is assumed to be risk averse and to maximize expected 
utility. Expected utility U is a function of expected profits 




























































































(3) U = U(ECP3, V [P3 ) , Ui >0, U 2 < 0.
The only element of uncertainty in the profit function <1> 
is the interest rate g at which maturing one period instruments 
can be rolled over for an additional period at t=l. Denote the 
expected value of g (taken at t=0) as ge and the corresponding 
variance as gs . Then from (1), we have:
(4a) ECP3 = Z2CiaiAi+ isiSj.* idiDj.3 + c (Di + D2> + ge < Ai + Si + Di) .
i=l
(4b) VCP3 = gs (Ai+Si+Di)2 .
The maximization of expected utility (3) can be set up as a 
Lagrangean maximization problem, taking into account the balance 
sheet constraint (2):
(5) Maximize L = U (ECP3, VCP3) - A(Ai +Si + Di + A24'S2+D2> »
with ECP3 and VCP3 defined in (4). The additional constraints 
that assets be positive and that liabilities be negative are not 
formally enforced in (5), but are included in the discussion 
below.
2.A Solutions without Capital Market Securities
The analysis of the maximization problem (5) is simplified
a ».
by first considering the case in which the securities positions 
Si and S2 are set equal to zero. The maximization of (5) is thus 
carried out with respect to the four balance sheet positions Ai, 





























































































(6a) 8L/3a i 
(6b) 3L/9d i 
(6c) 3l/9a 2 
(6d) 3L/3D2
= <ai+ge)Ui + 2gs (Ai+Di>U2 -  ̂= O ;
= <di+ge+c)Ui + 2g3 (Ai+Di>U2 = O ;
= <2a2>Ui - X. = 0 ;
= (2d2+c)üi - X = O;
Conditions (6a) and (6b) for Ai and Di show the tradeoff between 
the marginal contribution of these positions to expected income 
in the first term and to the variance of income in the second 
term. The marginal income term includes the one-period yield (ai 
or di), the rollover yield for period 2 (ge ), and for (6b) the 
marginal cost of deposits (c). Conditions (6c) and (6d> for A2 
and D2 have the same interpretation, but there is no marginal 
contribution to the variance of income since the yields on these 
positions are certain for the two period planning horizon.
The interpretation of these conditions is facilitated by 
noting that all portfolios for the institution must be built from 
one or more of the positions shown in Table 3:
Table 3
Position # Asset Liability Description
1 Al Di Tier Matched
2 A2 d 2 Tier Matched
3 A2 Dl Long Transformation
4 Al d 2 Short Transformation
The institution's choice among these alternatives depends on the 




























































































The conditions for each one of the positions of Table 3 to be 
part of the optimal solution are now developed as a function of 
the relative interest rate levels.
Tier Matched Solutions.
Define Mi, the marginal profit from tier-matched activity at 
tier i, as:
(7) Mi = iai - idi - c , i =1,2.
The first order conditions (6) require that Mi = 0 for an
interior Maximum. ® In this case the institution earns zero
profits since the loan interest income just equals the sum of the
deposit interest and operating expenses. It is assumed the
institution does not use tier-matched positions in this case.
This is also a razor-edge case since it requires the exact
constellation of interest rates that satisfy Mi = 0.
More generally Mi will not equal zero, and tier matched
portfolios will occur as corner solutions. If Mi is positive at
either maturity tier, then the institution maximizes profits by
carrying out the intermediation without limit. If Mi is negative,
then the institution wishes to expand by investing in deposits
and issuing loans, but is constrained by the condition that
assets be positive and liabilities be negative. Tier-matched
positions are thus zero whenever Mi<^0.
The upshot is that tier-matched portfolios are the optimal
solution for the institution whenever Mi > 0, and the institution
will carry out the tier-matched intermediation without limit. It
8. The substitution of <6b> into (6a> yields Mi=0, and the 




























































































is evident, of course, that institutions operating in this 
fashion will come to dominate their deposit and loan markets, and 
ultimately they will face an increasing marginal cost of deposits 
and a declining marginal revenue from loans. This is the case 
developed in Jaffee [19853. It is also noteworthy that tier 
matched solutions have no risk, and thus dominate the 
transformation positions <3> and (4) in Table 3 even when the 
transformation positions provide positive expected utility.
Transformation Solutions.
Transformation solutions become relevant as optimal 
solutions for the institution when Mi 0, that is when tier 
matched solution are not optimal. By the substitution of (6b) 
into (6c), the first order condition for transformation position 
(3) with Di and A2 can be written:
(8a) (2a2-cli-ge-c) Ui - 2gs ( Ai+Di ) Ü2 = 0,
and by the substitution of (6d) into (6a), the first order 
condition for transformation position (4) with Ü2 and Ai can be 
written :
(8b) (ai + ge-2d2-c)Ui + 2ga (Ai-*-Di )Ü2 = 0.
These conditions represent the tradeoff between the marginal 
contribution to expected profits and the variance of profits from 
the portfolio positions. For example, in (8a) the marginal 
contribution to expected income is represented in the first term 
by the two period return from the loan position A2 less the




























































































deposit position; and the marginal contribution to profit 
variance is represented in the second term by the magnitude of Dj..
From this point it is useful to focus the discussion on the 
case of long transformation alone (position 3 in Table 3) since 
this is the case of empirical relevance for the thrift 
institutions. Parallel results can be derived, however, for the 
case of short transformation. It is evident from (8a) that a 
necessary condition for long transformation (hereafter transform­
ation) to be an optimal solution is that the marginal expected 
profit T from the activity be positive:
(9) T = 2a2 - di - ge -c >0 .
In addition, however, it has been already noted that 
transformation activities will be optimal only if the 
corresponding tier-matched positions are not optimal; that is:
(10a) Ml = ai - di -
(10b) M2 = 2a2 - 2d2
Conditions (10) are thus also necessary conditions for optimal 
transformation activities to occur.
The substitution of (10) into (9) yields:
(11a) "■ 2a2 - «1 - ge > o
(lib) 2d2 ~ di - 9e > 0
Conditions (11) are an alternative statement of (lO) as necessary 




























































































essentially that there be risk premia in the term structures of 
interest rates for deposits and loans. The intuitive idea is that 
transformation positions can be optimal, when tier-matched 
positions are not, only if such risk premia exist in the yield 
curves.
Summary.
The empirical implications of the foregoing for the 
necessary yield spread conditions can be summarized as follows. 
The necessary conditions for optimal tier-matched portfolios are 
that Mi > 0, i = l,2 , with Mi defined in equation <7). If either 
one of these conditions holds, then tier-matched portfolios are 
used in unlimited amounts to generate infinite profits for the 
institution.
If tier-matched portfolio are not profitable, however, then 
transformation positions would be considered by the institution. 
The necessary conditions for optimal long transformation (short 
deposits Di to long loans A2> are given by equations (9) (that 
the transformation activity be profitable) and (11) (that there 
be risk premia in the term structures of deposit and loan rates).
2.B Solutions With Capital Market Securities
The possible role for riskfee capital market (say Treasury) 
securities as an additional element in the institution's optimal 
portfolio is now developed. Two distinct functions of these 
securities are considered: to meet the demand for earning assets 
or liabilities, and to hedge interest rate exposure.




























































































tier-matched portfolios. Treasury securities will be included as 
earning assets in tier-matched portfolios only if the yield on 
the Treasuries exceeds the yield available on loans. It is 
apparent, however, that in practice Treasury securities will 
yield less than loans. The key reason is that loan origination 
requires expertise whereas investment in Treasuries does not, and 
the market equilbrium would reflect this with lower Treasury 
rates. Treasury securities thus will not displace loans as 
earning assets in the portfolios of depository institutions. 
Treasury securities also will not be held by depository 
institutions with tier-matched portfolios as assets to satisfy 
hedging needs since there is no interest rate exposure.
The possible role for Treasury securities as liabilities is 
more complicated. Depository institutions can now carry out 
short sales of Treasury securities using borrowed securities and 
repurchase agreements, but high fees make it unlikely that the 
cost of such funding would be competitive with deposits on an 
ongoing basis. The institutions, however, can also issue 
liabilities directly in markets that trade instruments closèly 
related to Treasury instruments, and they appear to do so at 
least over certain maturity ranges. Net sales of Federal Funds by 
commercial banks represent the most important case, but 
commercial paper and preferred stock issues by bank and thrift 
holding companies, and advance borrowings by thrift institution 
members of the Federal Home Loan Banks perform a similar function 
for longer-dated instruments. The rates on these alternative 





























































































The role o£ Treasury securities as earning assets or 
liabilities in transformation portfolios is essentially the same 
as in tier-matched portfolios. That is, loans dominate Treasuries 
as earning assets, but Treasury related instruments may dominate 
deposits as liabilities over some maturity ranges. More 
importantly. Treasury security holdings can function to reduce 
the interest rate exposure of transformed portfolios, unlike the 
case of tier-matched positions.
Consider an institution that issues the amount Di of short­
term deposits, and invests in an equal amount A2 of long-term 
loans, with expected profits and the variance of profits derived 
from equations <4):
< 12) E CP] = <2a2 - di
( 13> VCP] = gs <Di>2 .
The variance in profits will be reduced to zero if the 
institution purchases short-term securities Si> 0 and issues 
long-term security liabilities S2 <0, both in amounts equal in 
absolute value to Di . Expected profits E«CP] are then:
<14) E*CP] = <2a2 - di + si - 2s2 - c)Di,
and the change in expected profits is:
(15) E*[p]-EtP] = si + ge “ 2s 2-
This change in expected profits, which measures the expected cost 
of carrying out the hedge, is exactly the negative of the risk 




























































































The institution will clearly use this hedging technique when 
the Treasury risk premium is zero, since the institution can then 
eliminate its interest rate exposure at zero cost. It appears 
generally, however, the Treasury yield curve has a risk premium, 
and the amount of hedging will decline as this risk premium 
rises. Indeed, there is an upper limit to the size of the risk 
premium, above which the institution will choose not to hedge at 
all. This upper limit is equal in size to the smaller of the risk 
premia in the loan and deposit yield curves. The risk premia in 
the loan and deposit markets determine the profit margin of the 
institution, and if the cost of hedging equals this amount the 
institution's profits have been eliminated (along with its risk).
This analysis of the hedging use of security positions 
applies to both cash market hedges, in which the cash markets for 
securities are used directly, and to futures market hedges, in 
which the organized futures markets are used. The commonality of 
the two hedging techniques arises because the pricing of futures 
contracts is based directly on the forward rates in the cash 
market term structure of Treasury yields. There is thus no 
difference in principle between taking a short futures market 
position in a one period ahead contract, and issuing a two-period 
Treasury instrument as a liability while simultaneously 
purchasing a one-period Treasury instrument as an asset in the 
cash markets.
As an empirical matter, it appears a fact (see Veit and Reif 
[1983]) that neither commercial banks nor thrift institutions




























































































interest rate exposure. This is understandable with regard to 
commercial banks since it appears they generally maintain tier- 
matched portfolios and thus have no need to hedge interest rate 
exposure. It is more complicated with regard to thrift 
institutions, since the large magnitude of their interest rate 
exposure in unambiguous. The limited use of futures contracts by 
thrifts can be explained, however, if the risk premium in the 
Treasury yield curve equals or exceeds the risk premium in either 
the loan or deposit yield curves.
3. AN EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR TIER MATCHING VERSUS TRANSFORMATION
Empirical data are presented in this section to evaluate the 
proposition that commercial bank operating margins significantly 
exceed those of thrift institutions, and that this is consistent 
with the use of tier-matched strategies by the banks versus the 
use of transformation strategies by the thrifts. It is worth 
noting at the outset that the data come primarily from regulatory 
reports, and while this leads to at least superficial uniformity, 
the structure of these reports is far from perfect for present 
purposes. Perhaps most importantly, there is little attempt to 
report various costs and revenues by functional activities. 9 
The data cover the cost of deposits, operating expenses, and the 
return on loans for the two classes of institutions.
9. The basic problem appears to be that depository institutions, 
at least in the U.S., carry out very little functional cost and 
revenue allocation. For example, the Federal Reserve System has a 
widely used, but voluntary survey and analysis of functional cost 
data for member institutions. From a universe of over 14,000 
commercial banks, however, only 608 participated in the most 




























































































3.A The Cost of Deposits
Table 4 shows data on the effective interest cost of 
deposits at Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls), the major 
thrift institution group, and at commercial banks. The rates are 
calculated by dividing the total interest paid on deposits by 
deposits outstanding for each group. The data are presented in 
five year intervals starting in 1965 and include 1983.
S&L deposit rates rose steadily over the period, reflecting 
both the trend in interest rate levels generally and the 
deregulation of ceilings on deposit rates starting in 1978. 
Commercial bank time deposit rates, which are comparable with S&L 
deposit rates, showed a stable pattern through 1975, with the 
commercial bank time deposit rates about 1/2 a percentage point 
below the S&L rates, reflecting customer preferences for 
commercial bank deposits. The data for 1980 and 1983 show a more 
erratic pattern.
The cost of total commercial bank deposits, not just time
deposits, is relevant for analyzing profit margins. Total bank
deposits include demand deposits on which little or no explicit
interest is paid. The effective rate on total commercial bank
deposits, including the low or zero cost of demand deposits, is
much below the S&L cost. The commercial bank benefit from demand
deposits has been shrinking to be sure, as shown by the declining •»>
percentage of total deposits that are demand deposits, but the 
low interest cost of demand deposits becomes more valuable when 
nominal interest rates are high. As of 1983 the cost of S&L 
deposits exceeded the cost of total commercial bank deposits by 





























































































Effective Cost of Deposits, Annual Percentage
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
1. Savings and Loan 
Associations 4.25 5.14 6.21 8.78 9.71
Commercial Banks
2. Time Deposits 3.73 4.48 5.74 9.38 8.29
3. Total Deposits 1.59 2.18 3.37 6.64 6.54
4. Cl> - (3) 2.66 2.96 2.84 2.14 3.17
Memo:Demand Deposits 
/Total Deposits 57 51 41 29 21
Sources :
Saving and Loan Associations: Office of Policy and Economic
Research, Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Commercial Banks: Bank Operating Statistics. 1970 to 1983,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
June 1966 for 1965 data, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Data through 1975 exclude foreign deposits in 
foreign branch offices. Since these deposits are predominantly 
time deposits, demand deposits as a percentage of total deposits 
are overstated in the data shown for 1965, 1970, and 1975. The 






























































































The difference between commercial bank and thrift costs of 
deposits shown in line 4 of Table 4 will overstate the actual 
commercial bank advantage because demand deposit accounts are 
more costly to maintain, including the costs of services in kind. 
Table 5 provides data from the Federal Reserve System's 
Functional Cost Analysis concerning the functional costs of 
maintaining demand versus time deposits (see also footnote 9).
The allocated costs of maintaining demand deposit accounts have 
risen from 1.87* to 3.26* of demand deposits outstanding, while 
the allocated costs of maintaining time deposits have risen from 
.5754 to about .9654 of time deposits outstanding.
Thus in 1983 the costs of demand deposits exceeds the costs 
of demand deposits by 2.3* of the respective deposits 
outstanding. If this excess cost is averaged over the total 
deposit base, given that demand deposits represented 21S4 of total 
deposits in 1983, the cost of total deposits rises by .48* <=
2.3* x .21), that is about 1/2 of a percentage point. While this 
amount is not negligible, commercial banks still maintained a 
major advantage in total deposit costs.
Commercial bank costs may exceed thrift costs in areas other 
than direct demand deposit costs, reflecting the greater service 
levels generally provided by commercial banks. The broadest 
measure, which includes direct demand deposit costs as one 
component, is total non-interest operating expenses. The data in 
Table 6 compare the total operating expenses of S&Ls with those 
of commercial banks, stated as a percentage of their respective 





























































































Non-Interest Operating Costs of Demand and Time Deposits 
As A Percentage of the Respective Deposits Outstanding
1970 1975 1980 1983
Demand Deposits 1.87 2.32 3.03 3.26
Time Deposits .57 .57 1.01 .96
Source: Functional Cost Analysis. Federal Reserve System. Data 




As a Percentage of Total Deposits
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
1. Savings and Loan
Associations 1.30 1.42 1.53 1.67 2.08
2. Commercial Banks 2.27 2.78 2.79 3.15 3.63
3. <2> - Cl) .97 1.36 1.26 1.48 1.55
Sources :
Savings and Loan Associations: 1984 Savings Institutions 
Sourcebook. United States Leageue of Savings Institutions.
Commercial Banks: Bank Operating Statistics. 1970 to 1983,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Federal Reserve Bulletin. 





























































































almost identical growth rate for both groups of institutions 
since 1965.
By 1983 the commercial bank cost ratio to total deposits 
exceeded the S&L ratio by 1.55 percentage points. As indicated 
above, about .5 percentage points of this amount can be 
attributed to direct demand deposit costs, leaving about 1 
percentage point of costs to reflect other special bank services. 
The 1.55 percentage points of excess bank operating costs offsets 
about one-half of their 3.17 percentage point advantage in total 
deposit interest expense, but still leaves 1.62 percentage points 
as a net commercial bank advantage in operating margins.
3.C Rate of Return on Loans.
The rate of return earned on loans is the last component to 
be considered in comparing commercial bank and thrift operations. 
For this purpose, mortgage loans and commercial business loans 
are considered the primary loan instruments of the thrift and 
commercial banks respectively. These instruments are now compared 
in terms of the gross returns available on them after loan 
default losses. It can be noted that evidence from the Federal 
Reserve System's Functional Cost Analysis indicates that the 
expense of originating commercial loans may exceed the expense of 
originating mortgage loans by as much as 1?< of the loan volume. 
This extra cost of commercial loans is already included, however, 
in the bank operating expenses just considered in 3.B.
Table 7 shows annual average values between 1970 and 1984 






























































































Average Annual Interest Rates










1970 7.91 8.45 .54 6.48 7.35 .87
1971 5.72 7.74 2.02 4.67 6.16 1.49
1972 5.25 7.60 2.35 4.77 6.21 1.44
1973 8.03 7.96 - .07 7.01 6.84 -.17
1974 10.81 8,92 -1.89 7.70 7.56 -.14
1975 7.86 9.00 1.14 6.28 7.99 1.71
1976 6.84 9.00 2.16 5.52 7.61 2.09
1977 6.83 9.02 2.19 5.71 7.42 1.71
1978 9.06 9.56 .50 7.74 8.41 .67
1979 12.67 10.78 -1.89 9.75 9.44 -.31
1980 15.27 12.66 -2.61 10.89 11.46 .57
1981 18.87 14.70 -4.17 13.14 13.91 .77 '
1982 14,86 15.14 .28 11.07 13.00 1.93
1983 10.79 13.12 2.33 8.73 11.10 2.37
1984 12.04 13.42 1.38 9.76 12.44 2.68
Aver-
age 10.19 10.47 .28 7.95 9.13 1.18
Sources: [13 , [43, and [53 : Federal Reserve Bulletin and Annual
Statistical Diqest, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. [23: Office of Policy and Economic Research, Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB mortgage rate series includes 
37X adjustable rate mortgages in 1983 and approximately 60* 
adjustable rate mortgages in 1984. Using estimates of the author, 
.55 percentage points in 1983 and 1.05 percentage points in 1984 
are included in the tabulated data to maintain consistency with 
the fixed-rate data of earlier years. This assumes a spread 
between fixed-rates and variable-rates of 1.5 percentage points 




























































































comparing commercial loan rates with mortgage rates. Column Cl] 
shows the commercial loan Prime Rate. By using the prime rate for 
this purpose, the commercial loans can be considered essentially 
riskfree. It is likely that, commercial loan rates on loans above 
prime amply compensate banks for the actuarial costs of default, 
so that the prime rate is if anything too low as an estimate of 
the risk adjusted yield on all commercial loans.
Column [2] shows the average effective mortgage loan rate 
for fixed-rate contracts. There is risk of delinquency (payments 
in arrears) and foreclosure (default) on such loans. Delinquency 
rates have approached 1 percent of loans at times. Actual 
foreclosure, however, is rare, with current rates under .05 
percent, so the actuarial risk adjustment appears negligible. The 
maturity aspect of fixed-rate mortgages is a more serious matter, 
since the stated maturity of these mortgages is typically in 
excess of 20 years, and even the effective maturity (taking into 
account that the contracts become due when the property is sold) 
is on the order of ten years. The analysis that follows focuses 
on this matter.
Column C3] of Table 7 shows the difference between the 
mortgage rate of column [23 and the commercial loan rate of 
column Cl]. The average difference is a relatively small .28 
percent*" for the 15 year sample. Ascending yield curves have been 
more common than descending yield curves over this period, 
moreover, so that after correction for their longer-term 
maturity, it would appear that mortgage rates were below 




























































































adjustment, the data in column [6] shows the spread between 10- 
year Treasury rates (column C5]) and 1-year Treasury rates 
(column C4]). The Treasury yield spread averages 1.18 percentage 
points over the 15 year sample, which is substantially larger 
than the mortgage rate/commercial loan rate difference. Indeed, 
taken at face value, this indicates that after adjustment for 
maturity differences, mortgage rates are almost 1 percentage 
point less than commercial loan rates.
An alternative basis for this maturity adjustment is 
available with new data on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). ARMs 
have recently represented the majority of mortgage originations. 
During 1984 ARMs were frequently priced at 2 percentage points 
above the 1-year Treasury bill rate. Using this formula, ARMs 
rates during 1984 would have average 11.76X, about .25 % below 
the average prime rate. Similarly, over the full 15 year sample, 
ARMs rates would have averaged 9.95%, again about .25 H below the 
sample average for the prime rate.
3.D Summary.
The evidence surveyed here indicates that commercial bank 
profit margins exceed thrift institution margins by a substantial 
amount, probabily in excess of 1.5J< . The key commercial bank 
advantage lies in their demand deposit accounts, which provided a 
total cost of deposit funds more than 3X below the thrift 
institution cost of funds in 1984. This advantage is offset in 
part by higher non-interest operating expenses for commercial 
banks; bank operating costs exceeded comparable thrift costs by 




























































































a profit margin advantage of about 1.5 percentage points remains 
for the banks. Finally, a comparison of the gross returns on 
commercial loans for the banks versus mortgages for the thrifts 
suggests, after correction for maturity differences, that bank 
loan returns exceed thrift loan returns by at least .25 
percentage points and possibly more.
4. THRIFT MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY RESPONSE
Profit margins for thrift institutions following tier- 
matched strategies are too low to be attractive, especially given 
the negative net worth (at market prices) of most of these 
institutions. On the deposit side, thrift institutions face 
competition from honey Market Mutual Funds and commercial banks, 
and essentially must pay money market rates for their funds. On 
the mortgage loan side, homeowners require significant rate 
concessions to borrow with adjustable rate mortgages, and 
mortgage banking competitors have become increasingly aggresive. 
The resulting operating margins are just too low to cover 
operating expenses and to provide a significant profit.
There are several alternative strategies. Term structure 
intermediation, with the institutions borrowing short and lending 
long, remains appealing given the large and continuing risk 
premia in the term structure. Regulators understandably dislike 
such policies, since the Deposit Insurance reserves bear 
essentially all of the risk, given the industry's limited net 
worth. But, on the other side, regulators should then not be 
surprised to see loan quality deteriorate as the institutions 




























































































A second strategy is for the institutions to enter new 
business lines. Mortgage banking, in which large volumes of 
mortgages are originated and sold to final investors with fees 
earned in the process, has been a frequent and successful choice. 
Mortgage banking may be successful because it makes use of the 
existing expertise in mortgage lending and the institution's 
portfolio for "warehousing" mortgages awaiting sale. While 
mortgage banking is a risky undertaking, the activities can be 
placed in a subsidiary of a holding company, thus protecting the 
thrift institution and thereby the insurance Fund from the risk. 
Regulators should be warned, however, that this strategy is 
reminiscent of banking in the U.S. before the separation of 
commercial banking from investment banking.
Cost reduction is a third strategy that has been pursued by 
a small number of institutions, but may be worthy of more general 
consideration. Average thrift operating costs were about 2X of, 
total deposits in 1983, but there are at least some institutions 
operating with costs 3/4 to 1 percentage point below this, level. 
The cost savings are achieved primarily by delivering deposit 
services with lower office occupancy and teller expenses, while 
the diminished service level is offset by paying slightly above 
market rates for deposits. Such institutions can compete with 
Money Market Funds on their own terms while providing a distinct 
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